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Periodically, the United States Supreme Court focuses on a particular
aspect of labor relations or employment law and issues a spate of opinions
redefining that area. In 1960, it focused on the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947' and the role of grievance arbitration in labor relations when it
decided the Steelworkers Trilogy-United Steelworkers of America v.
American Manufacturing Co.,2 United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co.,' and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.4 In 1977 it focused on the role of statistics in cases
brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' in deciding
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,6 Hazelwood School
District v. United States,7 and Dothard v. Rawlinson.' In 1998, its attention
was on sexual harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,'
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, " and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. "
Now the Court has turned its focus to the Americans with Disabilities Act 2
(hereinafter referred to as "ADA" or "the Act"), in still another trilogy of
cases where it has narrowly defined the term "disability" and, thereby,
significantly limited the scope and application of the Act.
* A.B., University of Illinois, 1969; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock School
of Law. 1978. Stephen W. Jones is the managing partner of the law firm of Jack. Lyon & Jones,
P.A., in Little Rock, Arkansas where he concentrates his practice in representing management
in labor, employment discrimination, and civil rights matters. Before graduating from the
UALR School of Law in 1978, where he was the first Editor-in-Chief of the UALR Law Journal,
he was a personnel manager and affirmative action specialist. He has also been a member of the
Board of Directors of United Cerebral Palsy of Central Arkansas, an organization promoting the
interests of persons with developmental disabilities, since 1978.
I. 29U.S.C. §§ 141-197(1994).
2. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
3. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
4. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to-17 (1994).
6. 431 U.S. 324(1977).
7. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
8. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
9. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
10. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
11. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is divided into three
primary Titles: Title I prohibits employment discrimination,13 Title i1 covers
discrimination in the delivery of governmental services, 4 and Title III covers
discrimination in access to public accommodations. 5
While each of the foregoing Titles has the common thread of relating to
individuals with a "disability," none of them separately defines it. Rather, the
definition is found at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), which precedes the separate Titles
discussed above: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. Thus, to
understand and apply the Act's provisions to real-life circumstances, one must
determine what is meant by: (1) "physical or mental impairment," (2)
"substantially limits," and (3) "major life activities of such individual."
Unfortunately, the Act itself provides no definitions of these terms. However,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") has
attempted to address this omission by way of regulation. 6
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). Title l's prohibition against employment
discrimination states: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees. employee compensation, job training, and
other terms. conditions, and privileges'of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994). Title i states: "Subject to the provisions of
this sub-chapter. no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(1994).
15. See 42 U.SC. §§ 12181-12189 (1994). Title Ill provides: "No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
16. The EEOC's "Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act" are found at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998). They provide, in
pertinent part:
(h) Physical or mental impairment means:
(I ) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine;
or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
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Against this statutory and regulatory back drop, the Supreme Court was
asked to address the meaning of "disability" and, correspondingly, the scope
and breadth of the ADA's application in Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc. 7 and
(i) Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
(j) Substantially limits-
(I) The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working-
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph 0)(2) of this
section, the following factors may be considered in determining
whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life
activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has
reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within
that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class ofjobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of other
jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the
individual is also disqualified because of the impairment
(broad range ofjobs in various classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998).
17. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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its two ancillary cases: 8 Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg"9 and Murphy v.
United Parcel Service."0
I1. THE ROLE OF CORRECTIVE DEVICES IN DETERMINING DISABILITY
In the leading case, Sutton v. United Air Lines. Inc.,21 the Court was
asked to address whether the determination of an individual's disability was
made with or without consideration of the impact of corrective devices or
other mitigating measures which would ameliorate the consequences of an
impairment.22 Sutton involved twin sisters both of whom sought to be global
airline pilots with United Air Lines.23  Both sisters had identical vision;
uncorrected, their vision was 20/200 in the better eye and 20/400 in the lesser
eye.2 4 However, in both cases, their vision was correctable to 20/20 with the
use of eyeglasses or contact lenses.2 ' United Air Lines, however, would not
accept any global pilot whose uncorrected vision in either eye was worse than
20/100, and, therefore, the plaintiffs were denied employment as global pilots
because of their visual impairment.26
The sisters sued under the ADA alleging they had the physical impair-
ment of restricted vision which substantially limited the major life activity of
working since they were prohibited by United Air Lines from serving in the
capacity of global pilot.27 The plaintiffs contended they were qualified
individuals with a disability because they could perform the essential
functions of the job of global airline pilot with the reasonable accommodation
of using eyeglasses or contact lenses to correct their vision to satisfy the vision
requirements of the employer.28
18. While these cases involve employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA, the
Court's holdings on the scope of disability would apply to the other Titles as well. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. National Board ofMed. Examiners, No. 99-CV-72190-OT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12341. at *I (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10. 1999) (applying Sutton to action under Title Ill).
19. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
20. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
21. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).





27. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
28. See id. at 214i. The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment "against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (1994). The term "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as"an individual
with a disability who. with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111
(8) (1994).
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The implications of the issue raised in Sutton, however, go far beyond the
limited issue of whether measures that mitigate the effects of an impairment
should be considered in determining whether an impairment rises to the level
of a disability. Rather, the Sutton plaintiffs raised the specter of a definition
of disability which would cover the vast majority of working Americans
within its embrace. As the Court noted, "the number of people with vision
impairments alone is 100 million" and "more than 28 million Americans have
impaired hearing., 9 Another 50 million have high blood pressure.3" And the
list could go on. How many Americans have bad backs? Arthritic knees?
Migraine headaches? The list is virtually endless.
The dilemma facing the Court was only exacerbated if working was
considered a major life activity as it is in the EEOC Guidelines.3 It is akin to
defining a term with itself to argue that one has been denied a position
because of a disability while establishing the existence of a disability by the
denial of the job. The Supreme Court recognized this somewhat disquieting
logic in Sutton:
We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining
'major life activities' to include work, for it seems 'to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of[an impairment, from
working with others] .... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment,
when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap.' Indeed, even the EEOC has expressed reluctance to
define 'major life activities' to include working and has suggested that
working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort,
only 'if an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other
major life activity.'32
These reservations are well-founded. If working is a major life activity
and disability is defined without regard to mitigating or corrective measures,
then almost every American worker is disabled if any adverse employment
decision can be characterized as related in any way to a physical or mental
impairment. Since each ADA claim must be decided on a case-by-case basis
which is dependent on the unique facts of that claim, it would enable most
employees to state a claim which would require trial to resolve. Such an
interpretation of the statute would place employers in an impossibly
precarious position.
29. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
30. See id.
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998). which provides: "Major Life Activities means
functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking. breathing, learning, and working."
32. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
20001
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The major purpose of employment discrimination statutes is to compel
employers to change their practices to conform with the expressed public
policy set forth in those statutes, specifically, not to discriminate on the basis
of some prohibited factor. In this author's experience, this motivation
succeeds more through the employer's fear of the cost of litigation than
through its fear of an adverse judgment. Defense costs in employment cases
are frighteningly high. What is being litigated is motivation and that is never
simply done. Unlike personal injury cases which may involve an issue as
simple as whether the stoplight was red or green, employment cases involve
testing the underlying motivation of the employer. Practically, the employer
is faced with the daunting task of negative proof, i.e., improper motive was not
a factor. Rarely is there direct, express evidence setting forth that motivation.
Rather, it must be inferred from a variety of sources. Thus, in defending these
actions, the employer finds itself looking at how other employees were treated
in similar situations, which compels the review of a large number of
employment actions involving a large number of employees. The employer
must first determine which other employment decisions were sufficiently
similar such that an inference of motivation in the present action could be
drawn from those past actions. Ultimately, the employer finds itself pouring
through literally thousands of pages of personnel files and other records and
interviewing tens and sometimes scores of employees. It is not a simple
process, and it is very time consuming. Unfortunately, time equates to legal
fees.
Furthermore, employers do not face unbiased juries. The vast majority
ofjurors are themselves employees or are related to an employee. Fewjurors
have a background in management and those that do usually are eliminated by
peremptory challenge. Therefore, it is a naive employer who believes it can
successfully defend any employment discrimination claim by simply
challenging the plaintiff's ability to carry his burden of proving the em-
ployer's motivation was improper. The smart employer knows it must carry
the responsibility of proving its actual motivation. This, too, multiplies legal
fees.
Therefore, even though an employer may feel it has a legitimate
operation and is not discriminating, it, nonetheless, fears litigation, even when
it believes it can prevail, because the cost of successfully defending an action
can be almost as damaging as the cost of unsuccessfully defending one
(although the former is certainly more psychologically satisfying). In the
context of the ADA, if disability is so broadly defined that virtually every
employee who is subject to an adverse employment action can, at least,
articulate an argument that the action was based on his or her mental or
physical impairment, then he or she can state a cause of action under the
[Vol. 22
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ADA. Granted, he or she may not prevail, but that is little solace to the
employer whose concern is avoiding the lawsuit in the first place.
Within this larger context, the Supreme Court in Sutton turned to
deciding the more narrow issue of whether the existence of a disability under
the ADA would be determined with or without consideration of corrective or
mitigating measures.33 It concluded that the mitigating effect of corrective
devices and other treatment must be considered in determining whether a
particular impairment substantially limited the major life activity of an
individual and, thus, whether an individual met the statutory definition of
disabled.34
It is especially noteworthy that in order to reach this conclusion, the
majority ignored the ADA's legislative history. As Justice Stevens, writing
for the dissent, noted:
The ADA originated in the Senate. The Senate Report states that
"whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids." S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989).
The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states, in
discussing the first prong, that, when determining whether an individual's
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, "[tihe impairment
should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such
as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-
than-substantial limitation." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 111, p. 2 8 (1990).
The Report continues that "a person with epilepsy, an impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity, is covered under this test," ibid, as
is a person with poor hearing, "even if the hearing loss is corrected by the
use of a hearing aid."
The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor likewise
states that, "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
accommodations or auxiliary aids." Id. pt. II, at 52. To make matters
perfectly plain the Report adds: "For example, a person who is hard of
hearing is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing even
though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing aid.
Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of
the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are
controlled by medication."35
33. See id. at2143.
34. See id.
35. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2000]
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The majority,36 however, rejected this approach, holding, "[b]ecause we
decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no
reason to consider the ADA's legislative history."" The Court found that
three separate provisions of the ADA, when read in concert, compelled this
conclusion.3" First, it noted that the definition of disability as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of an individual" uses the present indicative verb form which the
majority concluded required that:
a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A 'disability' exists only
where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where
it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not 'substantially limits' a major life activity."
Second, the Court noted that the definition of "disability" required an
evaluation "with respect to an individual" and the determination of whether
a particular impairment substantially limited the "major life activities of such
individual."40 Thus, whether an individual has a disability is an individualized
inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and requires an analysis of
the specific effect of that individual's impairment on the life of that specific
individual.4 The majority noted that to make the determination of disability
based on the nature of the impairment, rather than upon the effect of the
impairment on the life of the individual,
would often require courts and employers to speculate about a person's
condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability
determination based on general information about how an uncorrected
impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's
actual condition .... Thus, the guidelines approach would create a system
in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of people
with similar impairments, rather than as individuals. This is contrary to
both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.42
36. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
37. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
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The Court also noted that such an approach would fail to take into account the
negative affects ofthe mitigating measures themselves.43 For example, several
medications have side effects which could contribute to a limitation on major
life activities."
Finally, and perhaps most important, the Court found it impossible to
harmonize the Act's specific reference to 43 million disabled Americans"
with'the potential of"160 million under a 'health conditions approach,' which
looks at all conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of
an individual. 46 Likewise, the Court noted that there were more than 100
million Americans with vision impairments, 28 million with impaired hearing,
and 50 million with high blood pressure.47 It found these numbers far larger
than the 43 million specifically articulated by Congress in the Act.
48
Therefore, the Court concluded that any legislative history wasirrelevant and
the intent of the Act, as written, required consideration of mitigating and
corrective measures in determining whether an individual was "disabled" for
purposes of the Act.49
IV. REGARDED AS DISABLED
As the Court observed, however, its inquiry in Sutton did not end simply
because it had concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish that they were,
in fact, "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA."0 The Act also prohibits
discrimination against individuals who are regarded as having a disability."
Such a misperception can occur in one of two ways. The employer "must
believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does
43. See Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2147. -
44. See id.
45. See42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)(1994).
46. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148.
47. See id. at 2149.
48. See id.
49. See id. While not discussed by the Court. further support for this conclusion is found
in the congressional findings incorporated into the Act. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)
states, "people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally." This
description hardly seems applicable to the plaintiffs in Sutton who admittedly, like tens of
millions of other Americans. have normal vision with the use of eyeglasses or contact lenses.
and who are trained as commercial pilots. Further. § 12101(a)(7) describes individuals with
disabilities as "'a discreet and insular minority who have been ... relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society .... Again, this description hardly fits the plaintiffs in
Sutton.
50. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
51. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)(1994).
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not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the
impairment is not so limiting."52
While there was no dispute that the plaintiffs were physically impaired
in light of their uncorrected vision, they contended "only that respondent
mistakenly believes their physical impairment substantially limits them in the
major life activity of working."53 The plaintiffs contended that United Air
Lines' 20/100 uncorrected vision requirement precluded them from serving as
global airline pilots and, therefore, created a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of working.54 The Court rejected this argument.55
First, the Court noted that the mere existence of a vision requirement
neither established a substantial limitation nor otherwise violated the ADA.56
By its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes
over others and to establish physical criteria .... [Aln employer is free to
decide what physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise
to the level of impairment-such as one's height, build or singing
voice-are preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some
limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less
than ideally suited for a job.57
Second, the Court held that, for there to be a substantial limitation on
working, the plaintiffs must be prohibited from performing far more than the
single job of global airline pilot.5" Citing the EEOC's regulations59 on this
issue with approval, it held "When the major life activity under consideration
is that of working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a
minimum, the plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs."60 In applying this principle to the Sutton plaintiffs, it was noted that the
position of global airline pilot is a single job, not a class of jobs.6 Further,
52. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
53. Id. The Court's language at this juncture is provocative. The Court observed.
"Petitioners do not make the obvious argument that they are regarded due to their impairment
as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. They contend only that respondent
mistakenly believes their physical impairment substantially limits them in the major life activity
of working." Id. (emphasis added). This language suggests the possibility of a different result
had the plaintiffs alleged they were limited in or regarded as substantially limited in the major
life activity of seeing. Their failure to do so, however, resulted in the Court limiting its analysis
to whether they were substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2150.
57. Id. (emphasis in original).
58. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2151.
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998).
60. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 215 1.
61. See id.
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there was no indication that being disqualified from a global pilot's position
disqualified the plaintiffs from other pilot positions.62 As the Court noted,
even the EEOC in its Interpretative Guidance observed, "[a]n individual who
can not be a commercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment,
but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier service,
would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working."63
Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that, if United's vision
requirement were imputed to other airlines, they would then be restricted from
being able to perform a broad class of jobs.' The Court held that "[a]n
otherwise valid job requirement, such as a height requirement, does not
become invalid simply because it would limit a person's employment
opportunities in a substantial way if it were adopted by a substantial number
of employers."65
V. MURPHY AND KIRKINGBURG
The principles enunciated in Sutton were reinforced by Sutton's
companion cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service" and Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg.
67
Murphy involved a mechanic who was required to drive commercial
motor vehicles as part of his job responsibilities. 68 As a result, he was
required to have a commercial driver's license which can be acquired only by
the satisfaction of certain Department of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT")
regulations.69 One of those regulations requires that a driver candidate have
"no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with
his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely. '7° At the time he was
hired by U.P.S., the plaintiff s blood pressure exceeded that permissible under
the DOT regulations.7' However, he was erroneously hired and allowed to
work.72 Subsequently, a review of his medical files disclosed this error and
he was directed to be retested for hypertension.7 a When his blood pressure
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (1998)).
64. See id. at 2152.
65. Id. at 2152 (emphasis in original).
66. 119S.Ct.2133(1999).
67. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
68. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2133.
69. Seeid. at2136.






still exceeded the permissible limits, he was terminated because he could not
possess the required commercial driver's license.74
The district court determined that, when he was on medication, he was
not substantially limited in any major life activity," and the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.76 Certiorari was neither sought nor granted
with respect to the validity of this determination, and it was, therefore, binding
on appeal. As a result, in light of the Court's decision in Sutton, Murphy was
not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, since it had already been
decided that he was not substantially limited in any major life activity when
he was taking his medication.77
Plaintiff alternatively argued, however, that if he was not disabled within
the meaning of the statute, then he was regarded as being disabled because of
his high blood pressure.78 Like the Sutton plaintiffs, the Murphy plaintiff
argued that his hypertension was regarded as substantially limiting him in the
major life activity of working.79
In also rejecting this claim, the Court reiterated the principle it first
enunciated in Sutton, that "substantially limited" means "significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities."8 The Court emphasized that a plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that he was "substantially limited in the major life
activity of working" which correspondingly required that he demonstrate he
was unable to work in either a class of jobs or in a broad range of jobs."
Petitioner has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to
perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial
motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is
undisputed that petitioner is generally employable as a mechanic.
Petitioner has 'performed mechanic jobs that did not require DOT
certification' for 'over 22 years,' and he secured anotherjob as a mechanic
shortly after leaving UPS. Moreover, respondent presented uncontroverted
evidence that petitioner could perform jobs such as diesel mechanic,
automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and gas-welding equipment
mechanic, all of which utilize petitioner's mechanical skills.1
2
74. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
75. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.. 946 F. Supp. 872. 881-82 (D. Kan. 1996).
76. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.. 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
77. See Murphy. 946 F. Supp. at 875.
78. See id. at 882.
79. See id.
80. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 16300)(3)(i) (1998)).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 2139 (citations omitted).
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The Court determined that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of
presenting evidence sufficient to permit the conclusion that he was substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working."3
In Kirkingburg, the plaintiff was a truck driver with a visual impairment
which left him with an uncorrectable visual acuity of 20/200 in his left eye. 4
As a result, he effectively had monocular vision and, as such, could not satisfy
the DOT visual standards for a commercial drivers license.85 Despite his
impairment, however, Albertsons had erroneously hired him as a commercial
driver, and he had served satisfactorily in that capacity for approximately 16
months when he was injured and took a leave of absence. 6 Upon returning,
he was obligated to take a physical at which time his visual impairment was
discovered by the employer.8 7 He then sought to obtain a waiver of the DOT
standards, but Albertsons, nonetheless, terminated him because he could not
meet the basic DOT vision standards.88 Although he later received a DOT
waiver, Albertsons refused to rehire him.89
The Court first addressed whether an individual may be disabled per se
under the ADA simply because of the nature of the impairment-monocular
vision in this instance.90 It rejected any such interpretation. 91 It noted the
record established that the plaintiff had learned to compensate for his vision
by making subconscious adjustments to the manner in which he sensed depth
and perceived peripheral objects. Reemphasizing its holding in Sutton, the
Court held, "We see no principled basis for distinguishing between measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures
undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems."93 It
was further emphasized that there is a statutory obligation to determine ADA
cases on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, it was inappropriate to adopt a
per se rule in determining the existence of a disability.' The Court did not
"suggest that monocular individuals have an onerous burden in trying to show
that they are disabled."95 It held simply that "the Act requires monocular
83. See id.
84. See Kirkingburg. 19 S. Ct. at 2165.





90. See Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167 n.8
91. See id. at 2167.
92. See id. at 2168.





individuals, like others claiming the Act's protection, to prove a disability by
offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own
experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial."96
The Court also rejected the argument that an employer may not follow
established regulatory standards when they are subject to waiver "without
making some enquiry [sic] beyond determining whether the applicant or
employee meets that standard, yes or no."97 The plaintiff argued that, before
an employer may insist on compliance with a regulatory standard, the
employer must first make a showing that a waivable standard is "job related
and justified by business necessity," and that "a reasonable accommodation
could not fairly resolve the competing interests."" A unanimous Court
rejected this proposition." As Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion
noted, "it would be unprecedented and nonsensical to interpret § 12113 to
require [the employer] to defend the application of the Government's
regulation to respondent when [the employer] has an unconditional obligation
to enforce the federal law."' 1
VI. ADA AFTER SUTTON
First, there are certain clear legal principles which are readily discerned
from Sutton and its sister cases. Foremost is that, in determining the existence
of a "disability" under the ADA, the focus of that inquiry is on the effects of
an impairment on an individual's major life activity rather than upon the
nature of that impairment. No matter how debilitating an impairment might
be, it cannot be presumed to rise to the level of a disability. This increases the
burden on a plaintiff, since no matter how severe the impairment, the plaintiff
still has the burden of demonstrating how that impairment affects him when
compared to the average person in the general population.' ° On the other
hand, it also complicates life for the employer because there is no black letter
list of "disabilities" to which an employer can easily refer and use to guide its
conduct. Rather, each situation will require an individualized assessment of
the effects of an impairment on a particular individual which increases the
possibility of error by the employer.
Second, the Court has also placed a major hurdle for plaintiffs to
overcome in their attempt to demonstrate a protected disability. Specifically,
96. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
97. /d. at 2170.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 2175 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.26) (1998)).
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if a plaintiff is seeking to use "working" as the major life activity affected by
an impairment, he will have to prove that the impairment.substantially limits
his ability to perform a broad range of jobs and will not be able to use the
ADA to further the goal of performing a particular job.
Third, employers now know that they may rely upon any minimum
physical requirements promulgated by federal statute or regulation. Employ-
ers will not be required to judge the legitimacy orjob-relatedness of any such
requirement. Instead, they may rely, without further inquiry, on such
regulatory standards.
VII. QUESTIONS REMAIN
There are, however, questions left unresolved. For example, what
happens when the individual has an easily correctable impairment but refuses
to take corrective measures? What if the plaintiffs in Sutton had refused to
wear eyeglasses or contact lenses? Could they then have argued they were
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing and demanded to be
permitted to use those eyeglasses as a reasonable accommodation since
without glasses their vision would have been substantially limited as likely
would be their ability to work in a broad range of jobs thereby triggering the
right to a reasonable accommodation they did not have by already wearing
glasses?
The Court emphasized both the individuality of the disability assessment
and the actual effect of an impairment rather than its potential effect. By
example, in Sutton, the Court emphasized that, "ifa person is taking measures
to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account."''0 2
And later, "a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently
'substantially limits' a 'major life activity."" 0 3 Such language strongly
suggests that employers will have to take individuals as they find them. If
those individuals, in fact, use a corrective device or other mitigating measures,
then their disability will be determined considering the effects of those
corrective measures. On the other hand, if the individual refuses, no matter
how unreasonably, to use some corrective measure, it may be that his
disability will be determined without regard to the availability of such devices.
Unfortunately, this may lead to the elevation of form over substance with
applicants and employeesjockeying for position by refusing to take advantage
102. Id. at 2146 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 2146-47 (emphasis added).
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of readily available corrective measures or by misrepresenting their reliance,
or lack of reliance, on such measures. Thus, employers are faced with the
possibility that, in addition to the usual areas of discovery in preparation to
defend disability claims, they will now have to add to those areas the
investigation of a plaintiff's past use of such devices. And it still remains to
be seen whether such past use even matters. The Court's emphasis on the
present tense leaves open the possibility that an individual may forego the use
of a corrective measure at any point. Thus, while an individual may have
worn glasses, for example, for decades, she may be free to stop using glasses
based upon how that affects her rights under the ADA. This certainly presents
the possibility of absurdly inconsistent results, but the overriding emphasis on
present effects in Sutton would support such a result."°
Additionally, it also appears that the Supreme Court has grave reserva-
tions about the propriety of classifying "working" as a "major life activity."
Much can be inferred from the Court's observation that,
[b]ecause the parties accept that the term 'major life activities' includes
working, we do not determine the validity of the cited [EEOC] regulations.
We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining
'major life activities' to include work, for it seems 'to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of[an impairment, from
working with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment,
when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap.'"°5
104. The one court to address this issue has reached just such a conclusion. In Finical v.
Collections Unlimited, Inc., No. CIV 97-1649, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13080 (D. Ariz. Aug.
19, 1999), the plaintiff had a hearing impairment which might have been corrected by use of a
hearing aid. However, she did not use one. The district court, in finding the existence of a
disability, observed:
[A]n individualized inquiry into the limitations faced by a claimant who does not use
corrective devices is inconsistent with an evaluation focusing on the limitations the
claimant would face in a corrected state. Both approaches frequently require
speculation-with respect to the latter, speculation about the limitations a plaintiff
would face if she used a corrective measure she presently does not use. and. with
respect to the former speculation about the limitations that a plaintiff would face if
she stopped using a corrective measure she presently uses.
Id. at *11-12.
105. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
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The Court underscored this observation in both Murphy 6 and Kirkingburg.1
0 7
In light of these comments, one cannot help but speculate that, given the
opportunity, the Court will reject the EEOC's regulations, at least, with
respect to the inclusion of "working" as a major life activity.
Finally, whatever one's opinion of the Court's decision and its underly-
ing rationale, it is undisputably clear that the Court is firmly committed to its
position. These were not close decisions. Any traditional philosophical
divisions on the Court were disregarded with at least seven members joining
in each of the three decisions and with all nine reaching a rare unanimous
verdict with respect to the right of employers to rely on federal regulations
governing physical standards. There is no reason to anticipate a retreat from
the principles enunciated in these opinions in future cases.
VIII. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
During the 1999 term, the Court also addressed the applicability of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to ADA cases. This doctrine prohibits a party
from taking a factual position in one legal proceeding that is contradictory to
a position taken by the same party in a different legal proceeding.'0 8 Before
Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp., ° it was becoming increas-
ingly prevalent for defendants to move for dismissal on the grounds that a
plaintiffs statement in an application for Social Security Disability or
Workers Compensation benefits that he was totally disabled was directly
contradictory of his representation in an ADA claim that he was able to work
with a reasonable accommodation.
In Cleveland, the Court determined that there are circumstances in which
a claim for disability payments, in that instance Supplemental Security
Disability Income benefits (hereinafter "SSDI"), could coexist with a claim
under the ADA."' As the Court observed, the Social Security Administration
106. The court stated "[a]s in Sutton... we assume, arguendo, that the EEOC regulations
regarding the disability determination are valid." Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
107. The Kirkingburg case stated as follows:
As the parties have not questioned the regulations and interpretive guidance
promulgated by the EEOC relating to the ADA's definitional section. for the
purposes of this case. we assume, without deciding, that such regulations are valid,
and we have no occasion to decide what level of deference, if any, they are due.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167-68. n.10 (citation omitted).
108. See, e.g., Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 992 (1993).
109. 119 S. Ct. 1597(1999).
110. See id. at 1600.
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does not take the possibility of "reasonable accommodation" into account
when determining of SSDI benefits."'
However, while the Court rejected any presumption that a disability
claim inherently contradicts an ADA claim, it did recognize that, depending
on the precise nature of the representation, a contradiction could still exist:" 2
An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a 'qualified
individual with a disability'-that is, a person 'who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions' of herjob.
And a plaintiff's sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits
that she is, for example, 'unable to work' will appear to negate an essential
element of her ADA case-at least if she does not offer a sufficient
explanation. For that reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply
ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total
disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation." 3
Thus, as with every other aspect of the ADA, the application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel will depend on a case-by-case analysis, in this
instance, one relating to the precise nature of the representation made. If that
statement is as simple as, "I am disabled for purposes of SSDI," then the
doctrine of judicial estoppel will not preclude an ADA claim. However,
should the plaintiff elaborate about the scope of his disability, and its impact
on his ability to work, he may find himself in the position that the two claims
are, in fact, mutually exclusive and the doctrine will prohibit his ADA
claim.'' 4
IX. CONCLUSION
The Court has clearly concluded that the protections of the ADA, at least
in the employment context, should be reserved for those individuals who "as
a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvan-
taged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.""'  This
description does not extend to protect individuals who, no matter how
unfortunately, are prevented from holding the particular job they prefer as
11. Seeid. at 1602.
112. See id. at 1603.
113. Id. at 1603 (citation omitted).
114. This is precisely what occurred in Mitchell v. Washingtonville Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 98-
7185, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19651 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) (holding prior statements to
Worker's Compensation Board and Social Security Administration that the plaintiff was
incapable of standing or walking and could only perform work while seated contradicted ADA
claim that he could perform job with substantial standing and walking requirements with a
reasonable accommodation).
115. 42U.S.C.§ 12101(a)(6) (1997).
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opposed to being unable to work in any meaningful way. In Sutton, Murphy,
and Kirkingburg, none of the plaintiffs were compelled to work outside of the
occupation of their choice. The Suttons, for example, could qualify for other
pilot positions than global pilot for United Air Lines." 6 Mr. Kirkingburg had
other driving positions available. In fact, Albertsons offered him alternative
jobs,"'7 and he, ultimately, obtained a waiver that would allow him to drive for
other companies."' Mr. Murphy, likewise, had numerous other mechanic's
positions available. 9
The purpose of the ADA is to allow individuals who, because of their
disabilities, are prevented from or hampered in participating in the mainstream
of American life. It was aimed at an "insular minority," not a broad majority.
Yet, if the expansive definition of disability promulgated by the plaintiffs in
these cases had been adopted by the Court, that is what precisely what would
have occurred. Virtually every working American would have been able to
articulate a claim of disability.
The Court has determined that not every impairment rises to the level of
a disability simply because it prohibits an individual from holding a particular
job. Just as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2° does not prohibit.
all discrimination based upon &ge-it only protects those over 40-neither
does the ADA protect all persons who are denied a position because of an
impairment. Rather, it only protects those who are disabled in a much broader
sense. All of us must face the reality of our personal limitations, some of
which may prevent us from holding the job we prefer. The ADA, however,
was not intended as a weapon to force employers to give employees the job
they desire. Nor was it intended to prohibit any consideration of physical or
mental impairments in determining job requirements or selecting employees.
It was intended to protect those who were being denied the opportunity to
work in a general sense or who were otherwise being denied access to the
mainstream of American life. The Court recognized this principle and
adopted an interpretation that appropriately limits the scope of the Act to those
it was designed to protect.
116. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 215 1.
I 17. See Kirkingburg, 19 S. Ct. at 2166 n.6.
118. Seeid. at2166.
119. SeeMurphy, 119S. Ct. at2139.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1998).
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